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DECLARATORY RULINGS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
By A LAN R. VoGEILEa*
INTRODUCTION
With its first important beginning in this country, perhaps,
in the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in
1887,1 governmental control of business and society has steadily
increased. In the year 1940 there were fifty-one federal agencies
with rule making power each devoted to the regulation of some
phase of our national economy 2  'With the advent of the war
crisis, many more phases of our normal life have become sub-
ject to direct governmental supervision.
That the administrative agency is a necessary adjunct to the
modern American civilization we are struggling to preserve few
persons will be heard to deny 3 In a complex, highly indus-
trialized society such as ours, a body which employs some of
each of the executive, judicial and legislative powers is a neces-
* LL.B. Kentucky, 1940; LL.M. Michigan, 1941, Cook Fellow in
Legal Research, Michigan, 1940-1941. A portion of this article has
been submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for an
S. J. D. degree.
'Act approved Feb. 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A.
secs. 1-2 (1940) The first administrative agency was the Bureau of
Customs, established in 1789. Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue was established in 1862. Act of July 6,
1862. Since, however, these agencies regulated matters which
were granted to be necessary functions of the federal government
and outside of state control, it can hardly be said that they are the
antecedents of the present admimstrative hierarchy.
'Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Adminstrative
Procedure, p. 7 (1941) (Hereinafter cited as Attorney General's
Committee Report.) For a general survey of the growth of the
administrative system, see ibzd, pp. 7-18; Landis, The Administrative
Process, pp. 1-46 (1938), Stason, The Law of Administrative Tri-
bunals, pp. 1-12 (1937), Gellhorn, Administrative Law, pp. 1-33
(1940), Freund, Growth of Administrative Law (1923), Hewart, The
New Despotism (1929), Blachly and Oatman, Administrative Legis-
lation and Adjudication, Chap. I (1934), Berle, Expansion of Amen-
can Admmstrative Law, (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev 430.
'The recent Walter-Logan bill sponsored by the American Bar
Association attempted to limit the authority of administrative
agencies and widen the scope of judicial review of their actions. But
even the Association declared that administrative boards were a
necessity. Report of Administrative Law Committee, (1939) 25 A. B.
A. Jour. 113. But see the remarks of Governor Slaton of Georgia,
ibzd, p. 94.
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sity if we are to have a well-ordered society 4 in time of peace
as well as war.
However, it is evident that we have not yet reached a
Utopia. There are admitted faults -withm the superstructure
of tins adminnstrative regulatory system.5 It needs renova-
tion in order to correct and facilitate its operations, not only to
make it a more efficient system solely for the sake of better gov-
ernment, but also to enable it to successfully compete with con-
flicting ideologies and methods of totalitarian government which
have enveloped such large sections of the world. Tins paper
will point out one of the deficiencies of our present democracy
and suggest a remedy
One of the outstanding criticisms of a government winch
has so many autonomous agencies within it is that as a conse-
quence it is difficult for one to know just what the law is in
regard to specific actions. Doubly difficult is it to attempt to
determine in advance what legal effect a contemplated course
of action will engender. Laws are increasing with greater
rapidity than the agencies winch administer them. As Mr.
Justice Stone said in 1916,6
it To the overwhelming quantity of legislation are due many
of the existing evils of our legal system. It loads down the machinery
although it steadily multiplies that machinery. Of even more
serious import is the perpetual adding of new and the changing of
old laws upon every conceivable subject, until the whole mass is
beyond the power of the human mind to grasp or comprehend, or
the power of the government to enforce."
There is hardly a field of economic endeavor today winch
is not in some way responsible to or under direct control of an
arm of the federal government. Aside from the control of war
production and prices by the War Production Board and the
Office of Price Adnimstration, agriculture is supervised and
regulated by the Surplus Marketing Administration and various
other bodies, labor relations by the National Labor Board, labor
"That the doctrine of separation of powers must be modified
under the administrative system, see Pound, Judicial Power, (1922)
35 Harv. L. Rev 787; Brand, Montesquieu and the Separation of
Powers, (1933) 12 Ore. L. Rev. 175; Sharp, The Classical American
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, (1935) 2 Chicago L. Rev. 385;
Franklin, The Passing of the School of Montesquieu, (1937) 12.
Tulane L. Rev. 1.
5Letter of the Attorney General to the President, Attorney
General's Committee Report, p. 251 (1941).
*Comments on Herbert Spencer's Sins of Legislators, The Man
Versus the State, p. 239, (1916) ed. by Truxtun Beale.
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standards by the Wages and Hours Division, transportation by
the Interstate Commerce Commission, banking by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, investments, securities, ex-
changes and public utilities by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. These are but a few of the many admunistrative
boards which daily exert a tremendous influence on the life of
the individual citizen.
But yet, despite the fact that these agencies are such an
important medium for the functioning of our government, we
have in very few cases made any provisions for giving the indi-
vidual any assurance of knowing what the law is in regard to
his prospective conduct until he has acted at ls peril. It is
neither efficient nor desirable that persons should have to leap in
the dark, only to discover after they have landed that their leap
was ill-advised.
Outside the field of administrative law, this difficulty has
been somewhat overcome by the technique of the declaratory
judgment. When a real controversy exists as to the rights of
one party against another, it is possible to obtain in advance of
action a binding statement of the rights of the parties. As
Borchard says,7
"One of the exceptionally valuable functions of a declaratory
action lies in the fact that it enables not only the individual to raise
the question of the validity of governmental action without pur-
porting first to violate an order and expose himself to penalty, but
it enables the administration itself to raise the question of its own
powers, when challenged, without running the risks entailed by
precipitate action on the assumption of legality."
Something of the declaratory judgment idea is needed m
the field of administrative law. There should be no reason, for
example, for a corporation to reorganize under the belief that
such consolidation entails no distribution of taxable income, only
to discover later that the reorganization renders the stock-
holders liable for so much tax that it would have been more
practicable to have abandoned the plan.s There should be some
method by which any person planning action which might be
subject to regulation by an administrative authority could obtain
in advance from that agency a binding declaration of the proper
SBorchard, Declaratory Judgments, (1934) p. 591.
aU. S. v Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 (1921) Rockefeller v. U. S., 257
U. S. 176 (1921), Cullinan v Walker, 262 U. S. 134 (1923), Marr v.
U. S., 268 U. S. 536 (1925)
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course to pursue, and the prospective resultant liability or legal
effect.
With the passage of declaratory judgments statutes, the
last few years have seen both federal and state courts provided
-with a device to furnish guidance and promote certainty in
many fields of legal relationships, where previously parties had
been forced to proceed at their own risk. A declaratory judg-
ment obtainable from a court, however, is not the solution to
uncertamty in the field of administrative law.9
Herman Oliphant, late General Counsel of the Treasury
Department, said in 1938 that one of the major problems of our
present system is the improvement of administrative processes
and techmques. 10 Oliphant stated that the basic aspect of the
problem is the need for letting the citizen know what is ex-
pected of him by the government at the time when he needs to
know in order to carry on his business with reasonable assurance.
Citing various examples of unnecessary hardships occa-
sioned by the lack of authoritative advance knowledge, Oliphant
averred that the declaratory ruling would be useful in almost
all kinds of tax cases, and especially helpful in disposing of those
questions which affect in the same way many different tax-
payers similarly situated. Without doubt such a procedure
would aid greatly in relieving taxpayers from the uncertainties
which now face them.
However, the declaratory ruling technique is not only use-
ful in the field of taxation, but also in nearly every field wherein
advance determination of the rights of the parties will result
in the prevention of costly errors on the part of citizens.1 As
will be pointed out, advisory rulings or opinions are at present
rendered by several administrative agencies. These include the
Securities and Exchange Comnnission, the Federal Alcohol Ad-
ministration, the Post Office Department, the Bureau of Cus-
toms and the Federal Power Coninssion. Other agencies such
as the Packers and Stockyards Division of the Department of
Agriculture, the Federal Trade Commission, the Social Security
Administration and the Department of Justice have varied
techniques to be noted later (in a subsequent article) which are
Attorney General's Committee Report, p. 30 (1941)
(1938) 24 A. B. A. Jour. 7.
"See Attorney General's Committee Report, pp. 30-33 and
citations (1941).
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designed to inform the individual of his rights and liabilities in
advance, and to give him either a go-ahead or a stop signal on
anticipated conduct.
These various devices have been given different names,12
but for our purpose all of them may be termed "advisory rul-
ings" At the outset we must distinguish between these advisory
rulings and what have been called "admnnistrative regulatory
orders" The regulatory order is issued by an agency to im-
plement a statute usually after a hearing and consultation with
representatives of all interested parties. It affects entire groups
or classes of the public, and emanates under statutory standards
such as "public necessity", "reasonable rates" and the like.13
It is in the nature of a statute itself.
The advisory ruling, on the other hand, is issued in re-
sponse to inquiry from one or a few members of the affected
public concerning proposed conduct. There may or may not be
a hearing, and even if there is one, the resulting order is not
intended as a blanket endorsement or prohibition of snilar
conduct on the part of other members of the public. These ad-
visory rulings have helped somewhat to dispel the cloud of un-
known possible legal consequences, but they are not completely
satisfactory
In most cases the ruling is not binding on the agency
which issues it, but carries within itself a notice that the
opinion is merely advisory Thus the government is free to
change its position after the individual has acted in reliance on
the ruling, and no remedy is available. Of course, in the usual
case the agency will probably not alter its stand, since before
it has consented to give an advisory ruling it has considered
carefully both the subject and the law governing it. Never-
theless, on occasion, administrative tribunals have changed their
positions much to the detriment of the person affected. The
requisite of certainty can be achieved only if provision is made
for the proper issuance of a declaratory ruling which will be
binding on the agency issuing it.
" See Blachly and Oatman, Federal Statutory Admmstrative
Orders, (1940) 25 Iowa L. Rev. 582, in wich they classify orders of
administrative agencies into ten different categories.
I ibzd at 585.
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PART I
FEDERAL ALCOHOL ADMiI1TRATION
We will now consider the various administrative agencies
which at present issue "advisory rulings" and the technique and
procedure used. The first of these is the Federal Alcohol Ad-
mistration.
Tins agency was established in 1935,14 and its purpose was
stated to be "to further protect the revenue derived from dis-
tilled spirits, wine, and malt beverages, to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce and enforce the postal laws with respect
thereto, to enforce the 21st amendment, and for other purposes."
Prior to its establishment its functions had been administered
by the Federal Alcohol Control Administration, which had been
set up under the authority of the National Industrial Recovery
Act.
Until 1940, the agency was a division of the Treasury
Department and was headed by an Adminstrator appointed by
the President. But pursuant to the provisions of the Reorgam-
zation Act of 1939,15 the President in June, 1940, abolished the
Administration and the office of Admnimtrator and transferred
their functions to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.'0 Thus
although the machinery for enforcement of the provisions of the
Federal Alcohol Control Act has been shifted for reasons of
economy to another agency, the same type of supervision is being
pursued.'
7
As expressed by the Admiiinntrator, i s
"Congress has vested in the Administration the responsibility of
regulating the business conduct of the alcoholic beverage industries,
in the public interest. The activities of the administration
constitute a relatively new field of federal endeavor. Since the
passage of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, the Federal
Government has played a larger part in controlling the legalized
liquor traffic from the social standpoint than ever before in the
history of the country"
"Act of August 29, 1935, c. 814, 49 Stat. 977, 27 U. S. C. A. secs.
201 et seq., as amended by Act of June 26, 1936, c. 830, Title V, 49
Stat. 1965, 27 U. S. C. A. secs. 201 et seq. (1940).
"Approved April 3, 1939.
"Executive Order, 5 F R. 2107 (1940).
'See for example, T. D. 5009, F R. Doc. 40-3983; filed Sept. 23,
1940, in which the Acting Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, issued amend-
ments to Article 3, See. 30(b) of Regulations No. 5 Relating to the
Labeling and Advertising of Distilled Spirits.
18 (1940) Annual Report, Federal Alcohol Administrator, p. 1.
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The Act places the alcoholic beverage industry under the
control of the Administration by the use of the permit system.
All members of the industry, with the exception of brewers,
retailers and state monopolies, are required to obtain permits,19
which are effective so long as the permitee complies with the
provisions of the Act, the 21st Amendment, and all federal stat-
utes pertaining to liquor.
20
The parts of the Act with winch we are most concerned
are sections 5(e) and 5(f) These sections empower the Admin-
istrator to issue regulations relating to the advertising and
labeling of distilled spirits. Section 5(e) also provdes that
a certificate of label approval issued by the Administration must
be produced before liquor will be released from customs cus-
tody And it is the practice of the internal revenue officers to
prohibit the bottling of alcoholic beverages unless the bottler
produces a certificate of label approval or a certificate of ex-
emption from labeling.2 1
These certificates of label approval are in effect advance
advisory rulings declaring that the submitted label fulfills all
the requirements of the statutes and of the regulations issued
under them. That such procedure is one of the major activities
of the Administration is attested by the fact that as of Decem-
ber, 1939, approximately 512,000 label applications had been
acted upon. Of these, 378,000 were approved, and 35,000 were
granted certificates of label exemption. 22 Tins task is per-
formed by the Label, Section, m cases where a question arises
as to the correctness of the interpretation of the regulation by
the Label Section examiners, the aid of the Legal Division is
invoked.
23
To the present time, seven general Regulations relating
to labeling and advertising have been issued.24 Under these reg-
ulations questions have naturally arisen from time to time, the
answers to winch are sought by application to the AdMinistra-
"Sec. 203.
"Sec. 204(d)
'Mono. No. 5, Attorney General's Committee on Admnstrative
Procedure, (1940) "Federal Alcohol Administration", p. 4.
2Gagume, The Federal Alcohol Adminzstration, (1939) 7 G.
Wash. L. Rev. 949, 953; (1940) Annual Report, Federal Alcohol
Administrator, pp. 8-9.
Gaguine, supra n. 22, at 954.
These regulations are lengthly and detailed. They are set out
m 27 C. F R. Chap. I, pp. 1-82.
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tion in the form of letters. In one such instance, distillers
desired to know whether the words "appetizer" and "aperitif"
could be used in labels and ads. This question arose as a result
of the Administration's often expressed opinion that any ad-
vertisement winch created the impression that the consumption
of alcoholic beverages would contribute to the mental and phys-
ical well-being of the consumer or that such beverages could be
consumed without detrimental effects, was prohibited under
the Act.25
In an opinion released in the Federal Register and circu-
larized to the industry, Adminstrator Alexander stated, "The
Administration takes this occasion to advise the in-
dustry that objection will not be voiced to the use, under the
following conditions, of the words 'aperitif' and 'appetizer' in
the advertising of alcoholic beverages." The release then listed
two detailed conditions under which the use was proper and
gave several examples of both proper and improper usage.A6
"On the other hand, any statement which would tend to give the
words 'aperitif' or 'appetizer' a meaning broader than that which
indicates merely the appropriate time or method of consumption,
would be prohibited. For example, it would be improper to state
that any particular brand will 'stimulate the appetite', or
'promote the flow of gastric juices', or to make any other similar
statement which tends to give the inpression that the product has
medicinal value, or that its consumption would have a beneficial
effect upon the human system."
Again, Section 41(a) (2) of Regulations No. 5 prohibits
the appearance on labels of statements which are disparaging of
competitors' products. 27 Various wholesalers had secured cer-
tificates of label approval for, and were distributing beverages
with the words "not artificially colored" and "not artificially
flavored" thereon. Upon complaint to the Administration, a
determination was made that such statements were in fact dis-
-2 F R. 2787 (1937).
'Ibzd: "In line with the views above expressed, it would be
regarded as permissible to state that 'It may be used at
any time of day, but is particularly appropriate as an appetizer before
meals or at the cocktail hour', or that 'It is especially good as an
aperitif before dinner"'
I' Section 205 (f) (5) of the Act authorizes the Administrator to
issue such regulations "as will prohibit statements that are dis-
paraging of a competitor's products." Section 41 (a) (2) of Regula-
tions No. 5 also gives examples of such proscribed statements: "Con-
tams no neutral spirits"; "Matured naturally-not heat treated";
"Not a compound, but a delicious distilled dry gmi"" "Should not be
confused with imitations that are made from neutral spirits"; "Con-
tains no headaches"
K. L. J.-3
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paragng within the meaning of the Regulation. As a result,
the Administration issued a release to all bottlers of distilled
spirits informing them that such statements could not
thereafter be used on labels.2 8 Thus bottlers were in effect
granted amnesty for previous good-faith conduct, and by revis-
ing their labels and securing new certificates of approval, could
avoid liability for violation of the Regulation.
Of course, if distillers wish to disregard these regulations
or advisory rulings they may do so and resist prosecution for
violation by averring the invalidity of the regulation in the
federal courts. 2 9 But if they comply, they have assurance that
they are free from any liability For the Adminnstration, m all
cases where it has reversed a prior-held position, has not under-
taken the prosecution of any action to penalize distillers who
acted in reliance on the former ruling prior to notice of the
change published in the Federal Register.3 0 As a matter of
fact, comparatively few orders of the Administration have been
contested in the courts, 31 since the judiciary is reluctant to
interfere with properly exercised adnnstrative discretion.
32
3 F R. 521 (1938).
Section 204 (h).
Treasury Department, Federal Alcohol Administration Re-
leases: 1 F R. 104 (1936) 2 F R. 2787 (1937), 3 F R. 521 (1938),
3 F R. 1756 (1938), 3 F R. 1903 (1938)
"For example, see Atlanta Beer Distributing Co. v. Alexander,
93 F 2d 11 (CCCA 5th 1937), cert. den. 58 S. Ct. 645, in which denial
by the Administrator of a license on the ground of probable violation
of the law by the applicant was held not reviewable in view of
evidence to support the finding. The court stated it was not vested
with adminstrative power to determine whether a permit should be
granted and couldn't substitute its judgment for that of the
Administrator.
'Other cases involving rulings of the Adminnstrator include
Arrow Distilleries Co. v Alexander, 109 F 2d 397 (CCA 7th 1940),
in which the Act was held valid and an order of the Admistrator
suspending a permit for selling misbranded liquor was affirmed,
there being evidence to support it, as against a contention by appel-
lant that the order was a result of a determination by the Admin-
istrator alone that appellant had violated a federal liquor statute
(26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1208) by falsifying certain records, and that the
Administrator did not have the power to make such determination
without a prior criminal trial. Thus the Administrator was able to
determine, independent of a court determination, that a violation of
the statute had occurred, and this determination by hn was not
dependent on any prior or subsequent court determination upon a
criminal indictment charging the same offense. In Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 25 F Supp. 771 (1938), the court upheld an order of
the Administrator pursuant to Regulations No. 5 refusing to allow the
release of whiskey from customs custody because of alleged nms-
branding. (Decree vacated on other grounds, 307 U. S. 171 (1939).)
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The supervision of advertising as well as of labeling by the
Alcohol Administration also entails the issuance of what are in
effect advisory rulings. In cases of minor irregularities in
advertising, the usual procedure of the Administration is to
write a letter to the advertiser, suggesting necessary revision in
advertisements to be used in the future. By the use of this
method offending advertisements are corrected within a short
period of two weeks or less, since the advertisers usually comply
with the proposed revisions suggested. In the year 1939 nearly
2,000 cases were closed in this manner by the Administration.35
Where the violation is more serious, the Administration has
in conformity with section seven of the Act accepted offers in
compromise, which are contingent upon a proof that the ob-
jectionable advertising has been discontinued and a stipulation
that future advertising will omit the violative material.3 4
The Administrator has stated that the agency will not
approve or disapprove any advertising material in advance of
publication. 35 But actually, a system of "preventive enforce-
ment" is used by which the legality of proposed advertising
matter is commented upon. In 1939, 1,109 informal conferences
were held with members of the industry or their advertising
agents at which proposed advertising campaigns were discussed.
As a result, several campaigns which the Administration felt
were violative of the statute were revised or abandoned.30 The
(1940) Annual Report, Federal Alcohol Administrator, p. 12.
'IbcL.
Ibzd. at p. 17.
"This type of 'preventive enforcement' has resulted in the
prevention of a large number of advertising campaigns which would
have been of objectionable nature if they had been allowed to appear
in print. The following are examples of proposed campaigns
which were abandoned or completely revised after criticism by the
Administration:
1. Two campaigns for spirit blends which were developed
around the theme that the products were aged, but which
failed to indicate that 20% of the product was aged whiskey
and 80% of it was neutral spirits.
2. Two campaigns regarding the merits of 'aged rum' when
neither of the products was entitled to claim age ., and
a third rum campaign developing the theme that rum which
did not state age on labels and in advertisements was an
inferior product. 1
3. Four beer campaigns featuring the tonic and invigorating
qualities of the product and the fact that it would not have
any deleterious effects upon the consumer.
4. A whiskey campaign developed around the theme that by
choosing the right whiskey you can enjoy yourself without
a headache.
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Admnstration in 1938 wrote 4,006 letters in criticism of pub-
lished advertising and commenting upon advertising copy sub-
mitted in advance of publication.37
The submission of proposed advertising to the Adminnis-
tration seems peculiarly adaptable to the technique of binding
declaratory rulings. Certainly the facts to which such a ruling
might be applied are fixed and certain, consisting solely of a
copy of the proposed advertisement. If a ruling were issued on
submission of an .ad, it would be comparatively simple to de-
termine whether the ruling had been violated, since the published
advertisement could be compared side by side with the
submitted copy
Another phase of the activities of the Federal Alcohol
Administration which leads to the issuance of "advisory rul-
ings" is its enforcement of the provisions of the Act dealing
with unfair competition and trade practices. Among other
statutory proscriptions are "tied houses," which can be induced,
among various ways, by the extension to a buyer of a period of
credit greater than usual.38 The Administrator was given power
to determine the usual credit period of the industry and then
issue regulations incorporating such determination.3 9 Due to
the fact that the industry was an infant one because of the recent
repeal of the 18th Amendment, the Administrator waited to
issue his regulation until a customary and usual credit period
had been established, and then provided that it should not take
effect for one year.40
Subsequent to the date of issuance and prior to the effective
date, the Administration received numerous inquiries asking
for a fuller explanation of the Regulation and seeking informa-
tion as to whether certain practices would be considered as
violative of its provisions. As a result, the Administration
5. A campaign which by the use of testimonials of famous
athletes was likely to be interpreted as an implication that
their athletic prowess was connected with the consumption
of whiskey." (1940) Annual Report, Federal Alcohol
Administrator, p. 17.
'I (1939) Annual Report, Federal Alcohol Administrator, p. 5.
The Report does not indicate how many of this total were written in
regard only to advertising copy submitted in advance. However, a
table in the Report indicates that 2,981 advertisements were
"presented and reviewed" at 1,323 conferences with industry
members or their advertising agents.
See. 205(b) (6)
Ibhd.
03 F R. 2809 (1938).
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issued a digest of interpretations of the regulation.41 This
release termed the answers to the inquiries therein "rulings,"
and stated that the opinions expressed were subject to revision
or modification at any tune. The substance of the rulings was
given in question and answer form, 27 separate situations being
covered. A typical excerpt is as follows .42
"2. Do the regulations prohibit a wholesaler from continuing to
sell alcoholic beverages to a retailer who has not paid his bills within
30 days, or to deal with such retailer upon a cash or c. o. d. basis?
"No. They don't prohibit selling to a retailer who is in arrears,
providing, of course, that the wholesaler does not induce the retailer
to deal with him by offering hin credit for more than 30 days."
Such advisory interpretations have been invaluable to the
alcoholic beverage industry But the system is not completely
adequate. For example, another excerpt from the same release
says in answer to the question of what extension of credit will
result in inducing purchases by a retailer .43
'Whether or not a particular extension of credit results in the
inducement prescribed by the statute can not be decided by the
Administration in advance."
The Administration was probably acting wisely by refusing to
give a specific answer and a definite commitment to such a gen-
eral, hypothetical question. But there appears to be no logical
reason why the Administration could not decide in advance
whether a specific proposed extension of credit would violate
the regulation.
Without a provision for a binding declaratory ruling there
remains the possibility that after an advertisement or a trade
practice has informally been found to be not violative of any
statutory or regulatory provision, the Administration may, for
any reason it deems expedient, determine that in fact the action
was proscribed and act accordingly In such a case the distiller
would be without relief in the courts unless he could prove that
the Admnnstrator had proceeded on a mistake of law, refused to
hear relevant evidence, or acted arbitrarily or capriciously to
the prejudice of the defendant.4 4
'4 F R. 1950 (1939).
Ultd.
Ibid, at p. 1952.
"Atlanta Beer Distributing Co. v. Alexander, 93 F 2d 11 (CCA
5th 1937), cert. den. 58 S. Ct. 645; William Jameson & Co..v. Morgen-
thau, 25 F Supp. 771 (Dist. Ct. of U. S., D. C. 1938), decree vacated
on other grounds, 307 U. S. 171 (1939), Arrow Distilleries Inc. v.
Alexander, 109 F 2d 397 (CCA 7th 1940).
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Little change would be required in the present procedure to
establish in the Federal Alcohol Adminnstration a system of
declaratory rulings. The present system of "informal con-
ferences" and "comments" on proposed advertising and of
"advisory rulings" on trade practices would have to be sup-
planted with a statutory procedure providing for the issuance
of a ruling that would, for a specified time at least, be binding
on the Admnistration.
A provision would also be required that a dissatisfied appli-
cant could immediately appeal to the courts an unfavorable
declaratory ruling. Without tins latter assurance, the applicant
would be faced with the alternative of abandoning Ins proposed
conduct or proceeding with it and facing withdrawal of ins
permit. If he fairly believes that the Admimstration is in
error, he should be entitled to have that question decided without
subjecting himself to the risks entailed by a violation of the
order. A scheme of declaratory rulings in the Federal Alcohol
Administration seems not only desirable and beneficial, but also
one that could be easily instituted.
Tmi POST OF iCE DEPARTMNT
A field in which the courts have left a great amount of dis-
cretion in the administrative agency regulating it is the postal
service. This may be due to the judicial doctrine that the use of
the mails is a privilege, and not a constitutional right.46 Thus,
in Bates & Guild Co. v Payne,47 the court said.
' See Mono. No. 5, Attorney General's Committee on Admmstra-
tive Procedure, (1940) "Federal Alcohol Adminstration", pp. 21-22.
46U. S. v. Wright, 78 U. S. 648 (1870) "The statute did not pre-
scribe rules to govern the action of the Postmaster General, nor did
it seek to interfere with the judicial discretion of the officer. It is
not competent for a court or jury to revise hIs decision, nor is it
re-exammable elsewhere, as there is no provision in the law to that
effect. It may be safely laid down as a general rule 'that where a
particular authority is confided to a public officer to be exercised by
him in Ins discretion, upon an examination of facts his decision
upon these facts is absolutely conclusive as to the existence of
those facts'" But see School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187
U. S. 94 (1902) in which a determination by the Postmaster General
that defendant was conducting a fraudulent enterprise was overruled
by the Supreme Court, two Justices dissenting, on the ground that his
finding was not supported by evidence; and Hurley v. Dolan, 297 F.
825 (1924), where the court said the finding of the Postmaster
General was "clearly wrong", having been based on a false report of
the solicitor.
47194 U. S. 106 (1903).
DECLARATORY RuLiNGs
"We think there is some discretion left in the Postmaster General
with respect to classification of publications and that the
exercise of such discretion should not be interfered with unless the
court be clearly of the opinion that it was wrong. We think
(his) decision should not be made subject to judicial investigation in
every case in which one of the parties thereto is dissatisfied.
"While, as already observed, the question is one of doubt, we
think the decision of the Postmaster General, who is vested by Con-
gress with the power to exercise his judgment and discretion in the
matter, should be accepted as final."'
Tins doctrine has resulted in much freedom for the Post-
master General in the supervision of the postal laws-both in
excluding matter from passage through the mails and in classi-
fying mailable material. Many items have by statute been ex-
cluded from the mails, including lottery matter and matter
winch is obscene, libelous or indecent, treasonable or fraudulent,
as determined by the Postmaster General.4 9  Matter winch is
mailable has been placed by Congress in four classes with vary-
ing rates, with the Postmaster General being authorized to de-
ternnne the proper class for each item. 50 It is the determination
by hm whether submitted matter is prohibited and its proper
classification if not winch has given rise to much of the litigation
involving the postal department.
One of the most interesting of these cases is Houghto v
Payne.51 Houghton, Miffin Co. published novels by well-known
authors in separate paper-bound volumes, one novel being issued
monthly, and all being printed under the general title, "River-
side Literature Series." From 1888 to 1902 these novels had
been classified as periodicals, but in 1902 a new Postmaster
General placed them in class three as miecellaneous printed
matter subject to a ingher rate. He in effect issued a declara-
tory ruling stating that hereafter, these publications would be
deemed to be class three matter, regardless of how they had been
classified in the past. The Supreme Court affirmed a denial
of an injunction to the publisher to prohibit enforcement of
the new classification, stating that the action of the Postmaster
- 194 U. S. 106, 111 (1903). Accord: Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Nat'l
Life Co., 209 U. S. 317 (1908), Brougham v. Blanton, 249 U. S. 495
(1919), Silberschein v. U. S., 266 U. S. 221 (1924), Missouri Drug Co.
v. Wyman, 129 F. 623 (1904), Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535
(1917) Ju Wah Son v. Nagle, 17 F 2d 737 (1927), New v. Tribond
Sales Corp., 19 F 2d 671 (1927).
a 39 U. S. C. A. sec. 259 (1940). And see 39 C. F R. 7.1.
39 U. S. C. A. sec. 221 (1940).
194 U. S. 88 (1903).
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General consisted merely of the revocation of a license. The
fact that prior officials had placed the material in class two
was held to have no effect, the Postmaster General was free
to classify the matter according to his proper determination.
5 2
In Bates & Guild Co. v Payne,53 a sinilar case decided at
the same time, the Court, following the same reasoning advanced
in the Houghton case, also demed a bill to compel recognition
by the Postmaster General of Plaintiff 's right to have an alleged
periodical admitted as second class mail.54
There are limitations upon the power of the Postmaster
General to make fraud determinations 55 and to classify mail-
able matter.56 But within Ins proper sphere, the Postmaster
General has a great amount of discretion, and certainly has the
power to issue advisory rulings. Up to the present time, eight
volumes of advisory opinions have been issued by the Solicitor's
Office of the Postal Service.57 These opinons for the most
part are inter-departmental, answering inquiries received from
local postmasters and other postal officials concerning routine
office problems. Some opinions have been given private parties,
however, as will be noted below, and many individuals have sub-
mitted their problems in advance to the local postmasters, who
in turn have sought an opinion from the Postmaster General.
58
I As a matter of fact, there had been much agitation during the
fourteen year period for Congress to place thins kind of publication in
Class 3 by statute. Congress had not done this. Accord: Smith v.
Payne, 194 U. S. 104 (1903).
194 U. S. 106 (1903).
" For cases considering the finality and scope of judicial review
of decisions by the Postmaster General other than those in the nature
of declaratory rulings, see School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
187 U. S. 94 (1902), Harris v. Rosenberger, 145 F 449 (1906),
Appleby v. Cluss, 160 F 984 (1908), U. S. v. Atlanta Journal Co.,
210 F 275 (1913), Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407
(1921), Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S. 138 (1922), Nu Fung Ho v. White,
259 U. S. 276 (1922), Aycock v O'Brien, 28 F 2d 817 (1928).
"E.g., School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94
(1902) in winch a fraud determination was reversed by the court on
the ground that the case concerned a matter of belief, and not fraud
in fact.
5"E.g., U. S. v Atlanta Journal Co., 210 F 275 (1913), holding
that where Congress provided that publishers of second class publica-
tions could send sample copies of such as second class for 1€ a
pound, the Postmaster General had no authority to issue a regula-
tion limiting the amount of such samples to 10% of the weight of the
publications. And see Payne v Railway Pub. Co., 20 App. D. C. 581.
"Opinions, Assistant Attorney General, Post Office Department,
vols. 1-8.
,sSee Mono. No. 13, Attorney General's Committee on Admnn-
istrative Procedure, (1940) "Post Office Department", pp. 88-91.
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This latter type of ruling is not regarded as conclusive by
department officials if occasion arises requiring the Depart-
ment's taking action against the mailer, even though there is no
allegation of deviation from the proposed material. In cases
where the Department finds the submitted matter plainly can-
not be transmitted through the mails, the ruling is considered
as in the nature of a final judgment.59
In one advisory opinion, the Solicitor said, "This office
may give opinions and advice only to the Postmaster General
and to officers of the Postal Service upon questions of law aris-
mg in the course of the service." 6 0 But it is obvious that this
restriction is one of form only, since individuals evade it by
submitting their problems to local officials who forward them
to the Solicitor. And in some cases, the Solicitor will issue the
opinion directly to the individual, or order a copy of the opin-
ion to be given to the party interested.61
An E. C. Webb of Boston, desirous of knowing whether
he could use the name "United States Registering Company"
for a business he was about to establish, inquired of his local
postmaster whether there would be any objection from the
Postal Service to the use of such name. The local official for-
warded the inquiry to the Solicitor, who ruled :62
"The Post Office Department has on numerous occasions taken
exception to the use of any name for a corporation of such
character as reasonably to convey the ipression that such enter-
prise is connected with it in some manner. The use of the name here
proposed would be misleading, and could not fail to result in much
confusion and misunderstanding. In my opinion, this Department
should not only object to the use of this name, but would have
ground for holding that the company adopting it was using false and
fraudulent pretenses in carrying on its business."
Similarly, in a letter to the 1st Assistant Postmaster Gen-
eral, the Solicitor gave the following opinion in regard to the
proposed use by the Interstate Accident and Relief Association
in certain advertising matter of the letters "U. S. M." as part
of a cut representing a U. S. mail carrier .63
"The use of any device which may convey the impression that
the advertisement has some connection or association with the Post
. lbid.
07 Opms. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D., 349 (1922). And see 6
Opins. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D., 373 (1916).
16 Opins. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 373 (1916).
'"4 Opms. Asst. Atty. Gen., P 0. D. 238 (1906).
"4 Opins. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 112 (1906).
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Office Department is objectionable, for the reason that it is rmslead-
ing and calculated to convey to the public a false impression
The use by a private concern of the letters "U. S. M." in connection
with advertising amounts, in my opinion, to a false representa-
tion, and it should not be permitted."
In another instance, a library society sought to determine
whether it was a member of that class of orgamzations desig-
nated by the act of July 16, 1894, as "professional societies"
and thus entitled to send its publications through the mail at
the second class rate. The society addressed an inquiry to the
3rd Assistant Postmaster General, who forwarded it to the
Solicitor, with an explanation of the orgamzation of the group,
its charter and its purposes. The Solicitor in an advisory opin-
ion stated,64
"A library association whose object is the promotion of
'library interests of the country by exchanging views, reaching con-
clusions, and inducing cooperation ' and whose charter and by-
laws indicate that it is not a money-making organization is a
professional society' within the terms of the act and its publi-
cations should be admitted to the second-class mailing privileges
extended by such act.
"The occupation in which learning and scientific methods are
applied to the conduct of public libraries is included within the word
'profession' "
The most outstanding example of circumstances in which
a private individual was by the use of advisory opinions en-
abled to conform his conduct to the statutes governing use of
the mails is represented by two opinions issued by the Solicitor
in 1916.65 The Postmaster at Chicago submitted a letter ex-
plaining the practice of the Chicago Insurance Exchange, main-
tamed by the Chicago Board of Underwriters, in using a mes-
senger service in the Insurance Exchange Building. The letter
was an elaborate explanation of the system then in use, the
legality of which was questioned in view of Sections 1289 and
1290 of the Postal Regulations. 0 The Solicitor stated that
"4 Opins. Asst. Atty Genl., P 0. D. 102 (1906)
16 Opins. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 373 (March 10, 1916) and
6 Opins. Asst. Atty Genl., P 0. D. 403 (May 22, 1916)
'Postal Laws and Regulations, Postmaster General (1913) secs.
1289-1290; Postal Laws and Regulations, Postmaster General (1932)
secs. 1710-1711. 'Whoever shall establish any private express for the
conveyance of letters or packets by regular trips or at stated
periods over any post route which is or may be established by law
shall be fined, (etc.) Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to prohibit the conveyance of letters by private hands
without compensation, or by special messenger employed for the
occasion only." See also, 18 U. S. C. A. see. 309, and 39 C. F. R. 19.2.
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the legality of the service depended on the answers to three
questions whether the relation to each other of the parties to
the business was within contemplation of the statute, whether
the system was a "private express for the conveyance of letters
or packets", and whether it was for the conveyance of letters
"by regular trips or at stated periods over-any route which is
or may be established by law" Proceeding to answer each of
these questions m the affirmative, the Solicitor said,67
"In conclusion, it is my opinion that the messenger service here-
in treated of is operated in violation of law and should be dis-
continued.
Regarding their request for suggestions as to the manner in
which the messenger service mght be readjusted to comply with the
law, you will please advise counsel for the clearing house that this
office is precluded by regulation from giving opinions or advice to
the public generally."
Nevertheless, a note at the end of the opinion stated that a copy
was enclosed for the use of the general counsel of the under-
writers.
Despite the fact that the Solicitor said he could not give
advice or opinions to the public generally the board of under-
writers must have been able to use the opinion as a basis for
reorganizing the messenger service to comply with the law.
For two months later an opinion was issued by the Solicitor
to Robert W Childs, counsel for the underwriters, in answer
to a letter from Childs. This letter had stated that upon receipt
of the prior opinion, the manager of the clearing house -immedi-
ately undertook to eliminate the objectionable features referred
to, and it also gave a detailed outline of the manner in which
the service was to be operated in the future, "if such a plan
comes withn the requirements of the law" After quoting the
letter, the opinion of the Solicitor concluded, 68
"As described by you the modified messenger service now being
conducted by the clearing house of the Chicago Board of Under-
writers appears not to be in violation of the private express statute
as was the original service in operation by the clearing house, and
the postmaster at Chicago, Ill., and the chief inspector of this
department has been so advised."
By the device of the advisory ruling the Board of Under-
writers had been able to conform the operation of the messenger
service to the requirements of the statutes, and thus escape
676 Opms. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 373, 376 (1916).
6 Opms. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 403, 408 (1916).
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possible liability which would have resulted had it been unable
to make use of this advance opinion.
In another case involving the private express statutes,
the Solicitor rendered an opinion determining that the proposed
use by a bank of armored cars to carry mail from the post
office to bank customers, when the armored car agency had been
authorized to receive the mail for the addressees, would not
be a violation of the statute. 69 And over the course of years
numerous opinions have been given concerning proposed action
by private individuals.
70
This policy is an admirable one, but it does not solve all
the difficulties. If rulings given in advance are adverse to the
applicant, the only methods at present by which he can test their
validity are by seeking an injunction against the local official 7 i
or by doing the prohibited act and subjecting himself to liability
If rulings given in advance are favorable to the applicant, due
to their lack of binding force he still is not insured against a
change of position by the Post Office Department, even though
tins possibility might be remote.7 2
The refusal of the Post Office Department to issue binding
declaratory rulings where fraud statutes are involved may well
be justifiable, since the variation of details between legality
and illegality may often be quite shadowy 
73
But in questiones where the facts are not likely to change,
a provision should be made for the issuance of declaratory
rulings. These should be granted upon application in the
7 Opins. Asst. Atty Genl., P 0. D. 660 (1928).
See, for example, 4 Opins. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 102
(1906); 4 Opins. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 112 (1906); 4 Opins. Asst.
Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 195 (1906), 4 Opms. Asst. Atty Genl., P 0. D.
238 (1906), 4 Opins. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 624 (1907), 4 Opins.
Asst. Atty. Genl, P 0. D. 626 (1907), 4 Opms. Asst. Atty. Genl.,
P 0. D. 685 (1917), 4 Opins. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 741 (1908);
4 Opms. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 790 (1908), 4 Opins. Asst. Atty.
Genl., P 0. D. 791 (1908), 4 Opms. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 758
(1908), 7 Opins. Asst. Atty. Gen., P 0. D. 194 (1921), 7 Opins.
Asst. Atty Genl., P 0. D. 349 (1922), 7 Opins. Asst. Atty. Genl.,
P 0. D. 383 (1923), 7 Opms. Asst. Atty. Genl., P 0. D. 660 (1928).
But see Appelby v. Cluss, 160 F 984 (1908) to the effect that
if a fair hearing has been granted and evidence adduced to support
the order, an injunction will not lie. Accord: Leach v. Carlile, 258
U. S. 138 (1922), Nu Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922), Aycock
v. O'Brien, 28 F 2d 817 (1928)
See Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S. 88 (1903), where a classifica-
tion was suddenly altered after 14 years.
I See Mono. No. 13, Attorney General's Committee on Admm-
istrative Procedure, (1940) "Post Office Department", pp. 89-91.
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proper case, and should be made binding on the department
at least for a stated period of time. With provision also made
for testing the validity of the declaratory ruling immediately
in the courts, a great burden would be lifted from those who
now are unable to secure a binding determination of their pro-
spective rights and liabilities and are desirous of so doing.
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
The Securities and Exchange Commission was not estab-
lished until 1934,74 but its powers have continually been in-
creased by Congress until it now admiisters five important
statutes. These include the Securities Act of 1933, 7 5 the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,76 the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935, 77 the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,78 and
the Investment Company Act of 1940.79
The Commission is another agency winch has adopted the
practice of giving advisory rulings in regard to the interpreta-
tion of the statutes it administers and the regulations it pro-
mulgates under them. Tis policy is both a progressive and an
advantageous one. As the Commission has said:80
"The advisory service afforded by the Commission has been
designed for the benefit of those seeking assistance in their endeavor
to comply with the Acts. But the Commission has likewise bene-
fitted. Through correspondence -and conferences incident to the
rendering of advisory legal opinions, the Commission has itself
obtained invaluable factual information which has provided the
basis upon which existing rules and regulations have been improved
and which has materially aided the Commission m the promulgation
of new rules and regulations."
Advisory opinions were particularly necessary in the case of the
statutes administered by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, since the change in business methods brought about by
them was so marked and because a definite policy of administra-
tion was still in the formative stage.
The general plan of the first of these statutes, the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, is to require registration of all securities with
' 48 Stat. 885, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 78d.
"48 Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 77a et seq.
48 Stat. 881, 15 U. S. C. A., sec. 78a et seq.
49 Stat. 803, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 79 et seq.
"53 Stat. 1149, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 77aaa et seq.
' 54 Stat. -, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 80a et seq.
3rd Annual Report, S. E. C., pp. 59-60 (1937). And see (1935)
1st An. Rep., p. 10, and 2d An. Rep. p. 11 (1936).
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the Commission that are sold or offered for sale in interstate
commerce. A prerequisite to registration, without which sale
in interstate commerce is forbidden, is compliance with the re-
quirements set out by the statutes or by the Commission under
appropriate statutory authorization. Certain transactions are
specifically exempted from the statutory requirements, and the
Commission is given authority to exempt from registration
other transactions m regard to which it finds that enforcement
of the act is not necessary in the public interest.81
Due to the technicality of the enterprise which Congress
was attempting to control by that statute, it was only natural
that many questions should arise among members of the in-
vestment field whether certain transactions were to be consid-
ered as part of the practices which were subject to Commssion
control, or whether they could be classified as exempt trans-
actions. One of the first of these questions was the subject of
a release in December, 1933, in which a broker had sought to
learn whether "voting trust certificates" were to be considered
as "securities" The Commission said:82
"There can be no question but that voting trust certificates are
subject to the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933. The definition
of the term 'security' contained in section 2(1) of the Act expressly
includes a 'voting trust certificate'"
Again, an issuer of bonds carrying a conversion privilege
desired to know whether the issuance of such bonds was to be
considered a "sale" or "offer to sell" the stock into which the
bonds were convertible. He sent an inquiry to the Commission,
which replied .83
"The issuance of (such bonds), under Section 2(3) of the Act
does not constitute a 'sale' or 'offer to sell' the stock into which the
bonds are convertible only if the conversion 'right cannot be
exercised until some future date' According to your letter, the con-
' Sec. 3b of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 77c (b),
provides that the Commission may exempt from registration securi-
ties with an aggregate value of less than $100,000 an issue if it finds
that enforcement of the Act in regard to such securities is not neces-
sary m the public interest. And see similar sections in the Trust
Indenture Act, 53 Stat. 1153, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 77ddd(d), Securities
Exchange Act, 49 Stat. 1375, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 78 1(f), Public
Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 810, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 79c;
Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. -, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 80a-
6(c), (d).
I S. E. C. Release on Securities Act No. 97, part 1 (1933).
IS. E. C. Release on Securities Act No. 97, part 2 (1933). This
release similarly contained the answers to a total of 15 questions
which had been received by the Commission.
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version privilege attached to the proposed bonds may be exercised
at any time after the bonds are issued. For tis reason the issue of
bonds willanvolve an offer of the stock which will require immediate
registration of the latter."
It is interesting to note that these questions regarding the
application of the act were answered by personal letter to the
inquiring party, but were later published by the Connmsion
as an official release. This suggests that the Commission realized
the value of advisory opinions not only as a way of solving the
problems of individual brokers, but also as a basis for a prec-
edent upon which action could be based in the future. As a
matter of fact, all releases by the Commission which are in the
nature of advisory opinions or interpretations of the various
statutes or regulations promulgated thereunder consist of the
publication of excerpts from letters to private individuals who
had sought advice from the Commission concerning proposed
action.
Not in all cases, however, will the Commission issue an
opinion which may be used as a basis for future action. Quite
often the release as published states that the opinion is that of
an official attached to the Commission, "and is not to be taken
as an expression of the views of the Commission.''84 Or in
some situations where an inquiry has been received, a release
will be issued merely stating general policy in regard to the pro-
posed transaction, and making no definite ruling concerning it.
For example, where an issue of $1,766,000 of Preferred Stock was
to be offered to twenty-five offerees, a question arose as to whether
this would be considered a "public offering", and inquiry made
of the Securities and Exchange Commission to ascertain that
fact. The General Counsel in a letter to the inquirer published
later as an official release, after stating that it was undesirable
for issuers to attempt to avoid registration by offering securi-
ties to an insubstantial number of persons, concluded :8
"Any opinion which I might render in connection with the
proposed offering might, I fear, be availed of by the issuer or by an
initial purchaser as a means of satisfying a dealer, at a later date,
that he might purchase the securities in question and market them
S. E. C. Release on Securities Act No. 748 (1936) And see
S. E. C. Releases on Securities Exchange Act No. 1411 (1937) and
No. 1462 (1937) containing opinions by the Director of the Trading
and Exchange Division, with the notation, "The foregoing is an
expression of opmion by the Director and is not a ruling of the
Commisslon"
IS. E. C. Release on Securities Act No. 285 (1935).
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without risk of violating the Act. You will appreciate that my
opinion would not actually have this effect, since in the case of each
transaction there would be involved matters of fact on which I am
not in a position to express an opinion.
"Accordingly, it seems a much wiser policy for me not to express
an opinion in the situation which you present as to whether a public
offering is involved."
More often, though, the opinion gives a categorical answer
and seems to be intended as a basis for a line of decision m
similar cases. Thus a release under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 reads as follows :86
"The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced an
opinion of its General Counsel, Allen E. Throop, regarding the appli-
cation of Sec. 6(a) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935 to the issuance of bonds and stock certificates in lieu of securi-
ties which have been lost, stolen or destroyed. The opinion of the
General Counsel is as follows:
"' It is my opinion that this section is not applicable to the
issuance of bonds or stock certificates in lieu of those lost, stolen, or
destroyed.'"
And even when such a sentence as the one quoted above dis-
claiming Commission authority for the opinion is included in
the release, it would appear that the issuance of the opinion by
the Commssion itself as an official release lends credence to the
theory that the opinion of the General Counsel or whoever it
might be does represent the Commission's views, and is thus in
the nature of an authoritative declaratory ruling.
Many advisory rulings issued by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission have been concerned with the Securities Act
of 1933,87 but all of them are by no means confined to inter-
pretations of that act. Rulings have been issued under each of
the statutes administered by the Commission. Thus, Section
16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193488 requires monthly
reports from persons and corporations of ownership of 10%
or more of equity securities of any firm listed on a national ex-
change. A question arose whether such reports were required
"S. E. C. Release on P U. H. C. Act No. 1093 (1938).
w'See the following S. E. C. Releases on the Securities Act: No.
70 (1933), No. 86 (1933), No. 97 parts 1-15 (1933), No. 131 (1934),
No. 285 (1935), No. 296 (1935), No. 312C (1935), No. 401 (1935),
No. 464 (1935) No. 538C (1935), No. 646 Class C (1936), No. 748
(1936), No. 802 (1936), No. 828 (1936), No. 929 (1936), No. 1235
(1937), No. 2029 (1939).
48 Stat. 896, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 78p.
DECLAnATORY RuLiNGs
if corporation securities held were not listed, and inquiry sent to
the Commission, which ruled -9
"Where no securities of a corporation are listed or admitted to
unlisted trading privileges on any national securities exchange,
Section 16 does not require reports from such a corporation or from
its officers, directors, or stockholders as to holdings of or transactions
in its stock."
Also arising under this same statutory provision was the
question whether reports should be made where the stock is
held in the name of the wife of the officer or director. A letter
was correspondingly sent to the Comnission, which replied: 90
"The mere fact that a wife, as a bookkeeping matter, keeps the
securities in her separate estate is not conclusive in determining
whether her husband is the beneficial owner within the mean-
mg of Section 16(a). The husband would appear to be
the beneficial owner if he has the power to vest or re-vest in
himself the full legal and equitable title without payment of
other than a-nominal consideration."
Similarly, questions arising under many of the provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have been answered by the
device of advisory rulings.91
The Public Utility Holding Company Act has also been the
subject of requests for interpretation addressed to the Commis-
sion. One such letter presented the question whether a reor-
ganized holding company could acquire control of more than one
integrated system if such control could not ultimately be re-
tamed by the reorganized company under the provisions of
Section 11.92 In reply the Commission stated:gs
c There is nothing in the terms of the Act which would
prevent the Commssion from sanctioning the acquisition by a re-
organized company of several integrated systems in different
localities or regions if the result of the acquisitions were merely to
bind together under common control companies or properties pre-
viously under common control and no others, particularly if the
acquisition by the new reorganized company would facilitate and
protect investors in the ultimate segregation, divestment of control,
reorganization or liquidation of the properties which may later be
required under Section 11."
IS. E. C. Release on Securities Exchange Act No. 68 (1934)
IS. E. C. Release on Securities Exchange Act No. 175, Class A
(1935).
O'See the following S. E. C. Releases on Securities Exchange
Act: No. 253 (1935), No. 461, Pts. 1-4 (1936), No. 1411 (1937),
No. 1462 (1937)
'49 Stat. 820, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 79 K(b)
S. E. C. Release on P U. H. C. Act No. 54 (1935). For other
releases containing advisory rulings, see the following S. E. C.
Releases on P U. H. C. Act: No. 156 (1936), No. 508 (1937), No. 590
(1937), No. 1093 (1938).
K. L. J.--4
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Until May, 1941, only one advisory ruling had been issued
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, but it is to be ex-
pected that more will be forthcoming as the occasion arises. That
ruling involved the necessity for the registration under section
7(b) of the Act of so-called "orphan trusts", the Sponsors or
distributors of which are no longer functioning. The General
Counsel said,
94
"According to your letter, the sponsors and distributors of the
securities of all of these trusts, for various reasons, are no longer
functioning on behalf of such trusts. However, by the terms of the
indentures creating such trusts they are to continue for a substantial
number of years."
The release continued with the General Counsel explaining that
since there were contractual duties to be carried out under the
indentures, it was his opinion that the trusts must be regis-
tered. It is to be noted, however, that the release contains no
statement that the foregoing opinion is that of the General
Counsel and is not the opinion of the Comunission.
The adoption of the policy of issuing advisory rulings
by the Securities and Exchange Commision is a step forward
in the improvement of its procedure. But the problem can
not be entirely solved until there is some binding force placed
upon these opinions. At present, reliance on the advisory
ruling might be greatly to the applicant's detriment. In one
case, for example, a stock broker obtained from a member of
the Commission's legal staff in the New York office an opinion
that certain plans for boosting the price of stocks listed on the
market were not illegal.9 5 In partial reliance upon this opin-
ion, the broker manipulated a pool in motion-picture stock,
raising the price to his own profit. He was prosecuted by the
Commission for this manipulation. In dismissing a defense
allegation that the practice was legal because the New York
counsel had so stated, the court said,96
"The fact that a member of the legal staff had informed
defendants that their practice was not a violation of the law does not
bind the Securities and Exchange Commission nor bar prosecution.
A representative of the Commission could not give defendant
an indulgence to do something that was illegal, even though the
illegality could be learned only after the act was done, and thus bar
the Commission from proceeding under the Securities Exchange
Act."
'4S. E. C. Release on Investment Co. Act No. 69 (1941).
IS. E. C. v. Torr et al., 22 F Supp. 602 (1938).
"Ibd, at p. 607.
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But there is no reason why what the court here decries
can not be done with the proper statutory authority A person
subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion should be able to obtain in advance from that agency a
binding declaratory ruling wnch will settle between the party
and the Commission all the rights in the particular transaction
proposed. Such a statute should include a provision allowing
an applicant to immediately appeal to an appropriate court a
declaratory ruling unfavorable to hun.
Although the unmediate task of the Commission might be
increased because of the necessity of issuing declaratory rulings
binding upon itself, this increase would be equalized by the
decrease in the number of prosecutions instituted for viola-
tion of the statutes. Most important, the problem of the indi-
vidual who at present does not know wnch way to jump would
be solved.
THE FEDERAL PoWER CommIssIoN
The final agency we will consider wnch at present has
a procedure for the issuance of what are in effect "declaratory
rulings" is the Federal Power Commission. Tins agency was
established in 1920,97 and as then constituted consisted of the
Secretaries of War, Agriculture, and the Interior. It soon
appeared, however, that the work was too much to be carried on
solely by these officials, and in 1930 the Commission was re-
orgamzed as an independent agency with five commissioners
and its own staff of employees. 98
The Commission has general authority to license the con-
struction or operation of any project necessary or convenient
for the development and improvement of navigation and for the
development and utilization of power affecting "any of the
streams or other bodies of water over winch Congress has juris-
diction under its authority to regulate commerce" 19 Authority
is also given to conduct investigations concerning the power
industry and the utilization of power, to determine the actual
legitimate cost of any licensed project, and to do other less im-
portant routine tasks.100 As a federal district court has put
it :201
P'Approved June 10, 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, 16 U. S. C. A. sec. 791
et seq.
"Act approved June 23, 1930, 46 Stat. 797, 16 U. S. C. A. sec. 792.
16 U. S. C. A. sec. 797(e)
'16 U. S. C.A. see. 797(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g).
" U. S. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 23 F Supp. 83, 115
(Dist. Ct., Va. 1938).
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"That purpose was to vest in the Power Commission the authority
to grant permits for and to exercise supervision over the construction
and operation of projects in the navigable waters of the United
States, and to furnish an opportunity to persons con-
templating the erection of dams or other structures to have it deter-
mined in advance of such construction whether the proposed struc-
ture was one over which the Commission would seek to exercise
control."
Section 27 of the Federal Water Power Act provides that
every person or corporation intending to construct a power
project on any stream over which Congress has control by
virtue of the commerce power other than navigable streams,
shall file with the Federal Power Commission a declaration of
intention that such project is contemplated for construction.
Upon this filing the Commission is authorized to make an inves-
tigation to determine whether the interests of interstate or for-
eign commerce would be affected by the project. If the Commis-
sion finds they would be so affected, the applicant must obtain
permission from the Commission to proceed further. But if a
finding is made that no interests of interstate or foreign com-
merce are affected, the applicant may proceed without further
resort to the agency 102
This statutory section is the basis upon which the Com-
mission has in the past twenty years acted upon over 150
declarations of intention. It may be noted that the filing of a
declaration was not made compulsory until 1935. As a result,
many projects have been constructed which the owners prob-
ably believe to be outside of federal regulation and for which
no license exists. At present the Commission is investigating
several hundred projects which are allegedly operating without
appropriate authority 1o3
But where a declaration of intention is filed, we have a
perfect opportunity for the issuance of what is in effect a
declaratory ruling. Where the finding of the Commission is that
no interests of interstate or foreign commerce are affected, the
Commission does not attempt to control further the construc-
tion of the power project. The applicant has a binding state-
ment that his project is outside the scope of federal regulation.
41 Stat. 1075. 49 Stat. 846, 16 U. S. C. A. sec. 817.
'Sen. Doc. No. 10, Part 12, 77th Cong., 1st Ses., "Federal Power
Commission", p. 5 (1941).
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Although it might be thought by some that the agency
would take every opportunity possible for bringing a power
project within its jurisdiction, such has not been the case. The
figures show that less than half of the projects for which a
declaration of intention has been filed were determined to be
within the jurisdiction of the Commission.' 0 4 As Commissioner
Manly said in 1934,105
"No agency of this government has more scrupulously respected
the rights of states in the interpretation of its jurisdiction; yet there
are those who still seek to picture the Federal Power Commission as
an invader, stretching its arms over streams that are far beyond its
legitimate province.
" The record speaks for itself. If the commission were
seeking arbitrarily to amplify its jurisdiction to the uttermost limit
the record would show that it had sought to assert its jurisdic-
tion, if not in all, at least in a majority of such cases.
It 124 such declarations of intention have been filed;
'no jurisdiction' was the finding in 62 cases. Jurisdiction was taken
in only 49 cases."
Where the Commission determines that it has no jurisdic-
tion over the proposed project, the determination is of course
final as far as the government is concerned, since the Commis-
sion alone will be the moving party in enforcing the Federal
Water Power Act. It is not likely that such a determination
would be contested by an applicant either, because freedom
from federal control is supposedly to his advantage.
When a determination is made, however, that due to the
navigability of the stream or the effect of the project on inter-
state or foreign commerce a license is required, the decision
may be appealed, but findings of fact made by the Commission
are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.' 0 6 Since
the recent decision by the Supreme Court in U S. v Appalach-
ian Electrc Power Co.i07 that stream is "navigable" when
reasonable improvements will render it navigable, it may be
expected that few determinations of navigability by the Com-
mission will be reversed by the courts, because it is not difficult
to present evidence that almost any stream is susceptible of
sufficient improvements to make it navigableos
(1938) 17th Annual Report, Federal Power Commission, p. 9.
'Work of the Federal Power Commission", (1934) 23 Nat.
Mun. Rev. 571, 572.
49 Stat. 860, 16 U. S. C. A. sec. 825(1).
61 S. Ct. 291, 9 U. S. Law Week 4069 (1940).
'See Note, (1941) 39 Mich. L. Rev 976, especially at 990-996.
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Heretofore, however, the typical Connmssion finding upon
declarations of intention was m the following form :109
'Whereas C. M. Hamrick has filed a declaration of miten-
tion to construct a water-power project on Cane River in Yancey
County, North Carolina; and it appearing:
(1) That the project works would consist of a log dam about
5 feet high, creating a pool 700 feet long, located about 12.3 miles
above the mouth of the river, and a 10 horsepower turbine for use
in operating a gristmill;
(2) That Cane River at the location of the proposed dam is
neither used nor suitable for use for purposes of navigation, and that
no improvements for navigation have been either made or authorized
by the United States;
(3) That the project as planned will be without appreciable
pondage or storage and will have no effect on the navigability of any
navigable waters of the United States.
Now, therefore, having considered said declaration of intention,
together with reports, correspondence, and other information pertam-
mng thereto, the Commission ftnds:
That the interests of interstate or foreign commerce would not
be affected by such proposed construction."
But even should fewer projects in the future be considered
as outside the scope of Commission authority, it is reasonable
to believe that advisory rulings in the above form will not
disappear.
Thus, power projects are submitted in advance to the Com-
nnssion, which in many cases will find the absence of facts upon
which its jurisdiction depends. The declarant is enabled to
determine in advance whether he is subject to federal control.
He is not faced with the prospect of learning later that a com-
pleted power plant has been built without proper authority
Here, as a matter of practice, statutory approval is being
granted in advance of the construction of the power project.
This procedure is nothing more than a declaratory ruling, the
advantage of which as administered in this field of federal reg-
ulation testifies to the desirability of introducing this procedure
in the other administrative agencies wherever possible.
1 (1935) 14th Annual Report, Federal Power Commission, p.
150. And, for example, see similar findings noted at 14th Ann. Rep.
147 (1935), 14th Ann. Rep. 130 (1935), 14th Ann. Rep. 194 (1935),
15th Ann. Rep. 60 (1936), l1th Ann. Rep. 122 (1931). Tables of
action taken on declarations of intention may be found in each of the
annual reports of the Commission.
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THE BuREA-u op INTERNAL REvEiJE
It is the established policy of the Comnnssioner of Internal
Revenue not to comply with requests for rulings on future trans-
actions, except where the Internal Revenue Code specifically
provides for such advance determination. The latest pro-
nouncement to this effect is contained in I. T. Mim. 4963,110
which provides m part as follows:
"Rulings will be made on prospective transactions only where
the law or regulations provide for a determination by the Commis-
sioner of the effect of a proposed transaction for tax purposes, as in
the case of a transfer coming under the provisions of sections 1250-
1253 of the Internal Revenue Code, or an exchange coming under the
provisions of section 112(i) of the Internal Revenue Code, or in
connection with the execution of a closing agreement under the
provisions of section 3760 of the Internal Revenue Code with respect
to a taxable period ending subsequent to the date of the agreement.
The Commissioner will exercise Ins discretionary power to enter into
a closing agreement for a taxable period ending subsequent to the
date thereof, only where such exercise is in the interests of a wise
administration of the revenue system. The established policy of the
Bureau in not complying with requests for rulings on prospective
transactions will continue to be followed except in the instances
hereinabove provided.
The exceptions enumerated in the foregoing ruling pertain
to the determination by the Commissioner in advance whether
a proposed transfer to a foreign corporation is part of a plan
to avoid income tax. Apart from these exceptions, taxpayers
have no way of learnng with certainty the amount of their tax
liabilities. This, to say the least, is not a commendable situ-
ation.
Possibly the most striking example of this uncertainty
and the confusion attendant upon it are the cases arising from
the purchase by Henry and Edsel Ford of the ninority stock
of the Ford Motor Company 1 11 The pertinent facts in these
cases are briefly as follows.
In 1919, the Fords, who owned 58 % of the Ford Motor
Company stock, negotiated for the purchase of the remaining
4112%. The minority stockholders were all either original
stockholders when the company was organized in 1905 or their
heirs. They were unwilling to sell unless their tax liability
for the profits from the sale could be ascertained. This, in
effect, depended upon the value on March 1, 1913, of the com-
=0 1939-2 C. B. 459.
'mJames H. Couzens, 11 BTA 1040 (1928), Horace Rockham,
12 BTA 1085 (1928), Woodworth v. Kales, 26 F (2d) 178 (1928).
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pany's stock. The sellers would be taxable only upon the in-
crease in value since that date. Ford's agent thereupon wrote
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue asking for a ruling
determining the March 1, 1913, value. After an exhaustive
and competent investigation, the Comnnssioner on May 19, 1919,
wrote to Ford's agent as follows
"* * * In reply you are advised that while ordinarily it is not
the practice of the Bureau to determine such questions in advance of
actual transactions, in view of all of the particular circumstances
surrounding this case, the Bureau feels justified in departing from
that practice and you are accordingly informed that upon considera-
tion of the figures shown by the books and returns of the company,
it is disposed to regard $9,489.34 as a fair valuation of the stock on
March 1, 1913, and one which should be used in computing any
profits made by the sale.
(Signed) Danel C. Roper
Commissioner."
Upon the basis of this ruling, the purchase price of the
stock was set at $12,500 a share and the sale consummated.
Mr. Roper went out of office on March 21, 1920, and sub-
sequently David H. Blair became Commissioner on May 26,
1921. After numerous conferences between the minority stock-
holders and the Bureau touching upon the question of the proper
year for taxability of a dividend paid in 1919 by court order,1 12
and after much discussion within the Bureau of the propriety of
disturbing Mr. Roper's ruling, and after much public agitation
and senatorial inquiry into the matter, the Comnssioner in
March, 1925, asserted a deficiency against all of the stockholders,
based upon the contention that the proper March 1, 1913, value
of the Ford Motor Company stock was $2,634 a share. This
would have increased the stockholders' profits approximately
$7,000 per share. The stockholders naturally contested the de-
ficiency and appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals, which finally
determined in 1928 that the proper value of the stock on the
pertinent date was $10,000 a share, indicating that the stock-
holders had overpaid their 1919 income taxes.113
It is, of course, impossible to ascertain the amount of money
spent by the government and by the stockholders in this series
of cases, but a fair estimate would put it in the millions. In
addition to this, the loss of time and discomfort occasioned to
all parties concerned must have been enormous. If the Comins-
"Dodge v. Ford Motor, 204 Mich. 459 (1919). And see Wood-
worth v Kales, 32 F (2d) 37, cert, den. 280 U. S. 570 (1930).
'- James H. Couzens, 11 BTA 1040 (1928)
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sioner's deficiency had been sustained, the additional tax on
Mr. Couzens alone would have been over $10,000,000. Further,
it is quite probable if such a low valuation had originally been
placed upon the stock for March 1, 1913, the minority stock-
holders would never have made the sale.
Yet all this costly litigation, uncertainty, and inconvemence
could have been avoided if the ruling of Commissioner Roper in
1919 had been final and binding upon the government. There
seems to be no logical reason why it could not have been. All the
facts which were necessary to determine the 1919 value were
available and were presented to the Commissioner when the orig-
inal mvestigation was made. Expert accountants surveyed the
books and records and made a general study of the automotive
field as of the date in question, and the ascertainment of value
was based upon sound principles. A redetermination by the
succeeding Commissioner could only have been made by a re-
examination of all the facts which had already been presented in
the first survey No new facts were brought to light, and the
situation necessarily remained unchanged. And yet the Board
of Tax Appeals held that although it was perhaps unethical for
the subsequent Commissioner to change his position to the detri-
ment of the taxpayers, there was nothing in the statutes to pre-
vent it. The advisory ruling was in no sense binding upon the
Bureau.
The final result in the foregoing cases was favorable to the
taxpayers.il 4 Yet, other cases have not had such a fortunate
conclusion.
In Angostura-Wupperman Corp. v. U S.115 plaintiff
sought to recover Internal Revenue Taxes on alcohol claimed to
have been erroneously and illegally collected. Plaintiff is the
maker of Angostura Bitters, which contain about 45% of alcohol.
The bitters are used as a flavoring extract and a digestive stimu-
lant and are not fit for beverage purposes. Prior to 1937, plain-
tiff manufactured its product in the United States and purchased
here for that purpose tax-paid alcohol. In 1937, plaintiff was
induced to move its plant to the Virgin Islands, upon the assur-
" Perhaps it should be noted that litigation concerning the tax-
ability of the 1919 transaction is still continuing. See U. S. v Kales,
- U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 214, 86 L. Ed. 192 (Dec. 8, 1941), aff'g. 115 F (2d)
497 (1940).
U. S. D. C., N. Y., May 20, 1942.
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ance that bitters made m the Virgin Islands would not have
their alcohol content taxed under the United States Internal
Revenue Code. As the court states.
"In several instances thereafter arising, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue ruled that the bitters were not subject to the
Internal Revenue Tax on distilled spirits, and in one instance, in
February, 1938, an Internal Revenue Tax of about $9,000, which had
been imposed on a slupment of Angostura Bitters from the Virgin
Islands was refunded to the plaintiff by the Internal Revenue
Bureau."
In November, 1939, however, the Cominssioner changed Ins
ruling and levied a tax on a snpment arriving in that month.
Although the present litigation involved only two shipments
in February and March, 1940, the Comnissioner asserted a tax
retroactively upon all shipments since 1937, the validity of winch
also depended upon the instant decision. After finding that the
imports were subject to tax, the court said.
"It may very well be that plaintiff was persuaded to transfer its
business from Norwalk, Connecticut, to the Virgin Islands in the
hope of saving the United States Internal Revenue Tax on the
alcohol content of Angostura Bitters it manufactured, but that does
not estop the Government from now asserting the tax if under a
statute enacted by Congress a tax was imposed. Likewise, the
rulings of the Internal Revenue Bureau on imports of Angostura
Bitters in June and July, 1937 are not binding upon the Government.
Even a ruling from the Treasury Department would not be con-
clusive. Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455, 468;
Helvering v Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90."
Unless, as is quite unlikely, the District Court decision is
reversed, the Wuppermann company will have learned at quite
some expense that reliance upon Government rulings concermng
taxes does not prevent the retroactive change of the rule so as
to assert tax liability for a transaction winch all parties con-
cerned had previously agreed was not subject to taxation.
It is not intended to state here that the adoption in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue of a binding declaratory ruling
technique would remedy all the ills of the admninstration of our
tax system. Various and more competent authorities have
pointed out numerous defects and suggested varying remedies. 116
'" See, for example, Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Pro-
cedure for Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxes-a Criticism and
a Proposal, (1938) 38 Col. L. R. 1393; Neuhoff, Our Federal Tax
Predicament and What Can Be Done About It, (1938) 12 Temple
L. R. 340; Magill, Federal Taxation, (1938) 72 U. S. L. R. 77; Pretty-
man, A Comment on the Traynor Plan, (1939) 27 Geo. L. R. 1038;
Maguire & Zimet, Hobson's Choice in Federal Taxation, (1935) 48
Harv. L. R. 1281, 1293-1307.
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The writer believes, however, that no change in the admin-
istration of the tax laws would be so helpful to the taxpayers
as a method by which they could learn in advance how the tax-
mg authorities would regard certain transactions. 117 Of course,
as is pointed out in the final report of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Law at page 71
"The declaratory ruling is not feasible in every circumstance in
which doubts may be present. A necessary condition of its ready
use is that it be employed only in situations where the critical facts
can be explicitly stated, without possibility that subsequent facts
will alter them. This is requisite to avoid later litigation concerning
the applicability of a declaratory ruling which an agency may seek
to disregard because, in its opinion, the facts to which it related have
not remained unchanged."
Thus, any declaratory ruling procedure in the Internal
Revenue Department should be safeguarded to provide for in-
applicability in case of later change in circumstances, and also
to insure that the procedure will not become the means by which
tax counsel may bombard the Treasury Department with hypo-
thetical situations an an endeavor to learn how close to the line
they can come without disadvantageous tax results. Such safe-
guards could be provided either by statutes or by regulation of
the Commissioner somewhat similar to paragraph 4 of I. T.
Mlim. 4 93 6.318
The tentative draft of the Internal Revenue Admnnistra-
tive Code provides in section 4171 that the Commissioner may
enter into a closing agreement regarding tax liability "in re-
3"See Traynor, (1938) 16 Taxes 195; Oliphant, Declaratory
Rulings, (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 7; Report of Subcommittee of House
Ways and Means Committee, A Proposed Revison of the Revenue
Laws, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (U. S. G. P 0., 1938) p. 55.
"'Supra, n. 110. Section 4 reads:
"4. The established policy of giving advice upon
requests of taxpayers or their representatives on
questions relating to the character and extent of tax
liabilities resulting from consummated transactions
affecting a return to be filed will be continued under
the following circumstances:
"(a)The complete facts relative to the transaction,
together with a copy of each contract, or other docu-
ment, necessary to present the question, must be given.
"(b) The names of all the real parties interested
must be stated regardless of who presents the question,
whether an interested party, attorney, accountant, or
other representative.
"(c) The request must be signed by the taxpayer,
or in case he is represented by an attorney or agent, the
request must be accompanied by properly executed
power of attorney.
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spect of any internal revenue tax for any taxable period." In
view of the policy and history of the bureau, it is unlikely that
such provision was intended to apply to future transactions.
Yet its language is that broad, and interpretation to include
prospective tax periods would be a step in the right direction.
If reason supports the applicability of declaratory rulings
in any administrative agency, the writer feels that nowhere is
this reasoning more compelling than in regard to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. With Federal taxes mounting steadily from
depression levels and with war costs putting the ceiling out of
sight, any device which would enable tens of millions of tax-
payers to ascertain in advance their tax liability for proposed
transactions should be greatly appreciated.
